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ABSTRACT 
Part of a comprehensive study to analyse British broadsheets’ coverage of the First Gaza War, this 
paper examines the moral arguments presented in editorials. Doing so, it showcases a non-dualist, 
relational inquiry of the representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Instead of focusing on what 
is empirically ‘true’, morally ‘right’, and ethnically ‘Israeli/Jewish’ or ‘Palestinian/Arab’ as extra-
discursive categories, it approaches them as discursive constructions and asks what relations, what 
forms of lives the editorials cultivate in representing them. The analysis demonstrates that whilst 
newspapers overwhelmingly imagine isolated and ahistorical essences to clash in Palestine-Israel, they 
do not exclusively do so. Traces of a discourse of relations, where ‘I’ (Palestinian or Israeli) is partly 
constituted by the ‘Other’ (Israeli or Palestinian) can also be found in the editorials. It is with the 
vicissitudes of such relational accounts that the article concludes. 
 
1. Introduction to a relational inquiry 
Academic and journalistic discussions alike pose the question to various representations of the Israeli-
Palestinian predicament: is it true or biased (Philo and Berry, 2004, 2011; cf., Gaber, Seymour and 
Thomas, 2009; Kemp, 2011; Shreim and Dawes, 2015)? As these inquiries contrast the record of the 
medium with a version assigned the status of truth, the perspective that overwhelmingly dominates 
them is whether the representation is true to the objective record and displays the corresponding 
cognitive-moral virtues, or it is pro-Israeli/-Palestinian and covers a corresponding authorial cognitive 
or moral deficit.  
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The question whether something is true or biased is so common that it feels counter-intuitive to 
enquire as to what it means. Yet, in seeking to provide a framework for the British representation of 
the 2008-2009 war between the IDF and Hamas, the starting point of this paper is precisely the 
dilemma of what this question – is a representation true or biased (pro-Israeli/Palestinian)? – entails, 
and whether it is a good starting point for engaging with issues of Palestine-Israel. As the question 
itself is laden with meaning, its productive power cannot be overlooked and it cannot but lead to 
answers that do not so much reflect on their purported referent of Israel-Palestine, but constitute it in 
dilemmatic ways (Butler, 2005). 
What we have when the question is asked whether a given representation is pro-Israeli or pro-
Palestinian is a series of dualistic and dichotomous assumptions (Benjamin, 2004). First, we have two 
communities, separate from each other and defining in their separation the relevant political-moral 
field. To ask whether a given representation is pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian means giving exclusive 
primacy to two essentially separate categories, Israeli (Jew) and Palestinian (Arab), in constructing the 
conflict, at the expense of any alternative categories and relations the political-moral imagination 
could use. Second, we have a representation assigned the status of truth, to which constructions are 
compared to but which, itself, is not discussed as a construction: it is not chosen but simply found, and 
represents no political-moral perspective as such. It is, therefore, self-evident to anyone in their right 
mind. Third, as a consequence, failure to comply with the standard of (self-evident) truth automatically 
prompts the question: why did some representation, instead of following the path of truth, ended up 
pro-this/-that? The failure of representation results in the dilemma of cognitive or moral deficit. 
Opposite to the moral quality required to correspond to the true representation of the conflict, we 
have dumbness or madness or badness. 
To be sure, the dilemmas of truth and justice are necessary for our political-moral conduct and cannot 
be dismissed or bracketed. The question rather is the function these dominant dualistic and 
dichotomous assumptions serve to approach morality and political action concerning the 
representations of Palestine-Israel. For the argument of this paper is that they are neither inevitable, 
nor desirable. The gaze that pre-forms representations as pro-Israeli/pro-Palestinian on the basis of 
two strictly separate communities and one pre-existing objective truth, and that subsequently 
examines what deficit led to possible bias can and should be challenged. 
Indeed, critical scholarship has upbraided contemporary inquiries for ‘tak[ing] for granted the 
distinction of Arab and Jew as two polarized identities having been constituted independently of each 
other’ and of those intellectual traditions that constituted the polarized distinction in the first place 
(Anidjar, 2005: xvii). Such critical inquiries are characterised by a refusal to study representations of 
the Jew (the Israeli) and the Arab (the Palestinian) assuming the existence of these categories to be 
completely independent of the representations themselves. Instead, they seek to examine how, in 
these representations, the dichotomous imagination replaces (or is resisted by) potential and actual 
inter-community relations. In the place of facts pre-dating discourse, the dichotomous conception of 
the (Israeli) ‘Jew’ and (Palestinian) ’Arab’ itself becomes an opposition emerging out of particular (yet 
not particularly appealing) human relations. 
Thus, we find for instance the familiar dichotomous order constituted at the very foundations of the 
‘invisible third’ of European Christianity, in whose self-definition the Jew finds itself as a religious entity 
(and, as such, becomes the enemy within) whilst the Arab finds itself as a political entity (and, as such, 
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becomes the enemy without) (Anidjar, 2005). Alternatively, we find the dichotomous conception of 
Jew versus Arab in the invisible third of ‘military logic’ that seeks to impose its categorical 
interpretation on an existing web of cross/trans-ethnic relations between 1947-1949 in Palestine, and 
create thereby from complex ‘civilian’ identities one dimensional ones for (and at) war (Azoulay, 2011, 
2013). Or we find it in contemporary British liberal institutions (such as universities) that actively pre-
form and perpetuate a particular type of agonistic community relation where any ambiguity is deleted 
from the picture in advance (Sheldon, 2016). 
These anti-dualistic and anti-foundational attempts to engage with the role of the ‘invisible third’ that 
constitutes the dichotomous Jew versus Arab order may be taken as extensions of a broadly relational 
poststructuralist or postcolonial agenda (Butler, 1993; Said, 1978, 2004), and, as such, may also be 
applied to the other dichotomies underpinning discourse concerning the representations of the Israeli-
Palestinian predicament. Just as the assumption of a foundational Jew versus Arab dichotomy can be 
replaced by an examination of what discourses might sustain this dichotomy, how they sustain it and 
at a cost of neglecting what alternatives, so truth and political-moral justice may be included in our 
analysis of representations, rather than simply assumed to exist independently of those 
representations (Butler, 2005).   
Thus, the dualistic assumptions that appear to govern the majority of discussions examining the 
representation of the Israeli-Palestinian predicament are by no means necessary assumptions. There 
is no reason therefore why we should start our inquiry with the presumption that distinct categories 
such as ‘Arab’, ‘Jew’, ‘truth’, ‘bias’ pre-date and have an extraneous impact on accounts. Instead, we 
could start by asking how these very categories are envisaged in the accounts we examine. Indeed, 
replacing the received dualistic concern with pre-established truth, morality, pro-Israeli or pro-
Palestinian bias, examining the British broadsheets’ editorial coverage of the first Gaza war, this paper 
will enquire what reality and what relationships are allowed by a given political-moral imagination for 
the protagonists of the conflict. What kinds of relationships are, explicitly or implicitly, constructed as 
possible?  
 
2. Contextual and methodological considerations 
The sample for the empirical investigation of these theoretical questions was editorials published by 
British daily broadsheets or quality newspapers (Daily Telegraph, Guardian, Financial Times, 
Independent, The Times) during the 2008-2009 ‘First Gaza war’ or ‘Operation Cast Lead’ (Kaposi, 2014). 
In total, twenty-three editorials were analyzed with a focus on the two traditional dilemmas of war, 
ius ad bellum (i.e., was the Israeli government’s choice to launch the war justified?) and ius in bello 
(i.e., was the conduct of the Israeli Defense Forces and Hamas in the war justified?). The variety of 
ways in which these questions were engaged with by the newspapers opened up a variety of ways of 
envisaging who the main agents of the war were, what their role, entitlement and responsibility 
consisted of, and how they related to other relevant agents. 
The political-moral importance of neither the tumultuous Israeli-Palestinian conflict nor the theoretical 
perspective focusing on dichotomous-dualistic interpretations may be in question. Indeed, they 
increasingly appear to resonate with global concerns of increasing tribalisation, polarisation and 
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demonization. However, the same significance and resonance is far from obvious with regard to the 
chosen sample. In short, why Britain? Why British newspapers? And why their editorials?  
To start with the first question, Britain’s role in the politics of Palestine uniquely fits the theoretical 
concerns introduced in the previous section and may arguably be taken to embody the position of the 
‘invisible third’: that which supposedly represents without being explicitly represented. Historically 
speaking, what is now simply referred to as the Arab-Israeli or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict evolved 
under the rule and within the frameworks provided by Britain as the mandatory power. Arabs and Jews 
did not find themselves in a neutral space, but one that was pre-formed by the British, and where they 
had not only to convince (or fight) each other but persuade (or fight) the British. The British gaze had 
therefore argued to be constitutive as to what became of the conflict, and what eventually became of 
Arabs and Jews in Palestine (Segev, 2001). And whilst the nature of British involvement obviously 
changed since British troops and officials had comprehensively left mandatory Palestine in 1948, the 
British viewpoint to this day not only continues to represent the all-important ‘international opinion’ 
for many in Israel/Palestine but continues to play a constitutive role in Israeli and Palestinian self-
representations (Herman, 2017). 
How, then, would we interrogate this ‘British viewpoint’? Where do we find it, what would properly 
represent it? There may be arguments that the best practice would be to consider official, diplomatic 
acts of the state; alternatively, opinion surveys or the vast realm of social media could be consulted. 
Whilst these would be reasonable choices, the decision to focus on quality newspapers may also be 
supported by a number of arguments. First, despite the fall in their circulation figures and the rise of 
alternative media, broadsheets still retain much of their power to influence public and political 
opinion. As various contemporary researchers suggest, print journalism still in significant respects 
leads and forms public-political agenda in contrast to the ‘echo chamber’ of social media (Deacon and 
Wring, 2016; Jackson and Thorsen, 2015). And second, the broadsheets examined cover virtually the 
whole of the British political spectrum, from the firmly conservative (Daily Telegraph), through the 
moderately conservative (The Times) and the liberal (Financial Times), to the left-liberal (Guardian, 
Independent).1 Incidentally, such positions are also taken to correspond to views on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, with those on the right-wing considered to be more in support of the State of Israel 
and critical of Palestinians, and those on the left more critical of Israel and more supportive of 
Palestinian efforts (Philo and Berry, 2004, 2011). 
Editorials, to turn now to the last question concerning the choice of the sample, admittedly form a tiny 
part of the newspapers’ output. Yet, they present an overall and overarching perspective of narratives 
and arguments that other parts of the newspapers do not. This does not just mean that they may be 
taken to form the backbone of the publication, or the explication of the viewpoint which then will 
dominate the newspaper as a whole. It also means that these editorials were the best candidates for 
embodying this abstract concept of a ‘British view’. Quantitatively speaking, they were not as widely 
read as data that could have been collected from Twitter. Qualitatively speaking, they were not on the 
level of sophistication that could have been gained from engaging with arguments proposed by moral 
philosophers. They were, however, what seemed as the best available forum in the sense of being both 
sufficiently accessed by the many and sophisticated enough for the few.  
                                                            
1 In March 2016 the Independent became an online only publication. 
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Of course, it is only so far these a priori arguments can take us. To justify the relevance and significance 
of the sample chosen, it is now to its analysis that we have to turn. 
 
3. The discourse of isolated essences: Daily Telegraph and Guardian 
We join the British broadsheets right at the beginning of the war, with the dilemma of whether Israel’s 
choice of launching the operation can be justified. At first, the conservative Daily Telegraph’s editorial 
engagement will be examined. It started with the following argument: 
Extract 1. 
The first reaction of most commentators was that the air attacks on Gaza were 
unnecessarily savage. The deaths of nearly 300 Palestinians, including civilians, seems 
disproportionate to the small number of Israelis killed by rocket attacks. […] But, before 
we jump to conclusions, we should pay close attention to the response of Mahmoud 
Abbas, chairman of the Palestinian National Authority. He blamed Hamas for triggering 
the Israeli raids by not extending its truce. His Fatah party is engaged in a vicious feud 
with Hamas, so this is perhaps what one would expect him to say. But he is right, none 
the less. Hamas did engineer this crisis, by firing rockets whose range has been increased 
so they can reach southern Israeli cities. (Daily Telegraph, 29 December) 
 
The dilemma about Israel’s right to launch the war is answered uncompromisingly: the newspaper 
considers Israel’s opting for ‘Operation Cast Lead’ entirely justified. Indeed, in this argument the Jewish 
state does not even choose the right course of action. Inasmuch as Hamas ‘triggered’ or ‘engineered’ 
the war, Israel did not quite exercise a choice. It was caused to act and did therefore launch the war 
by necessity. As such, it is not so much that the Telegraph makes Israel look right in a political-moral 
sense; Israel is beyond critical deliberation and without any substantive political-moral role in this 
argument. 
This, however, brings up the question of what it is in Hamas’s action that ‘triggered’ automatically the 
war. Although we read about the organization ‘not extending its truce’ and ‘firing rockets’ into 
southern Israeli cities, the material effects of these rockets are not spelled out. In fact, here or 
elsewhere, the only thing we learn about them is the ‘small number of Israelis’ that were killed by 
them. This leaves us wondering what exactly it is in the rockets that automatically ‘trigger’ a war, and 
how the killing of vastly more people in preventing the killing of an admittedly ‘small number’ can 
possibly be the morally right course of action. 
 Extract 2. 
Only one group of people can have derived any satisfaction from the footage of blood-
covered children being pulled from the rubble in Gaza: the fanatics of Hamas. This 
terrorist organisation has been firing rockets into Israel ever since the breakdown of the 
ceasefire, in the hope of provoking a furious Israeli response. And that is precisely what 
materialised.  
 
[...] Hamas is not a reasonable political movement. It cannot thrive without crisis; the 
blood of innocents is its own lifeblood. These are not Palestinian nationalists who 
happen to be Muslims; they are totalitarian Islamists whose Palestinian identity is of 
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secondary importance. They have nothing but contempt for Arab Muslim states’ (Daily 
Telegraph, 29 December) 
 
As the editorial continues, our attention is drawn not to the rockets themselves but their provenance, 
Hamas. While fighting Israel, Hamas does not fight for ‘Arab Muslim states’ or even for ‘Palestinians’ 
or for ‘children [...] pulled from the rubble of Gaza’. Its ‘fanaticism’ and ‘antisemitism’, its hatred of 
Jews and concomitant wish to ‘wipe out Israel’ is not matched by anything constructive. As it wishes 
to ‘wipe out [...] eventually, every secular Arab state’ too and ‘hope[s] to provoke a furious Israeli 
response’ that results in ‘the footage of blood-covered children’ (Daily Telegraph, 29 December), the 
image we encounter in the Telegraph is not simply of a terrorist organisation, but one of nihilism. And 
as it is total destruction that is located as the essence of Hamas, this will also be the quality that the 
rockets embody. Regardless of the actual material consequences rockets cause, what determines the 
political-moral choices of the situation is the exclusively destructive intention that guides them 
towards Israel. 
It is by constructing Hamas as an agent of pure destruction that the Telegraph accounts for why Israel 
is without substantive political-moral role in this conflict and why Israel’s waging war is not so much 
the morally right choice but the moral imperative any reasonable human being could possibly 
countenance. This way non-engagement and the complete lack of political-moral relations between 
Israel and Hamas, between pure victim and impure perpetrator, becomes not so much a practical 
impossibility but a sacred necessity. Support for Israel is absolute – but only on the equally absolute 
condition of Israel fulfilling its (non-)role. 
Needless to say, (left-)liberal newspapers had a different evaluation of the events. They all criticized 
the Israeli government’s choice of going to war, and suggested what they thought was the reasonable 
alternative of negotiations between Israel and Hamas. Yet, given that the Daily Telegraph’s verdict on 
‘law to war’ was based on Hamas being essentially destructive, the alternative solution of (left-)liberals 
entails addressing the pivotal issue of what Hamas is and whether negotiations are in fact possible with 
them. We will now look at how the different assessment of the political-moral situation impacted on 
the (left-)liberal Guardian’s construction of the identity of the conflicting parties and the possibility of 
relations between them. 
Extract 3. 
The Palestinians have always had a rejectionist wing, which for so long was represented 
by Fatah. Israel, too, has those who reject a Palestinian state, including many settlers. 
To think a solution can be found by killing rejectionists is to deny the entire course of 
the history of the Middle East. There is no military solution to Hamas's rockets, which 
continued to rain down on Israel yesterday. Nor is a ground invasion likely to stop the 
rockets. It could displace them, perhaps. But if that happened, Hamas's next tactic could 
be to use the Palestinians of East Jerusalem to wield the launch tubes. (Guardian, 29 
December)  
 
As the newspaper announces that there is ‘no military solution’ to the rockets, it is a very different 
image of Hamas from the Telegraph’s that we encounter. Not only is the Palestinian organisation 
branded with the fairly non-threatening term ‘rejectionist’, the object of their ‘rejectionism’ is never 
specified. What is more, even this non-threatening and object-less term is immediately qualified by 
asserting that Israel, too, has rejectionists. ‘Rejectionism’ thus becomes a trivial characteristic of the 
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conflict, nothing that would make Hamas become overly problematic when contemplating the 
possibility of negotiations. 
The construction of Hamas’s identity as a trivial one is a dominant characteristic of the Guardian’s 
argumentation. Elsewhere, we read the Guardian bluntly asserting that Hamas is ‘more than a guerilla 
army’: a ‘political movement as well’ (5 January); and that ‘their tactic and their strategy is no more 
and no less than resistance’ (29 December). Whilst no arguments are offered to support such 
judgments, the trivialization of Hamas certainly impacts on the newspaper’s construction of the 
rockets’ meaning: 
Extract 4. 
The death toll by last night had climbed to nearly 290, with more than 700 wounded. 
This in reply to hundreds of rockets from Hamas militants which killed one Israeli in six 
months. But the equation is always like this. (Guardian, 29 December) 
 
The Hamas rockets are depicted as inconsequential in the passage above. In line with the Guardian’s 
general construction of Hamas’s conduct, they are not suggested either to constitute any substantial 
obstacle to dialogue.  
So what is the obstacle? As from a moral necessity to counter destructive nihilism Israel’s war turned 
into a moral choice whose only use is to bring about massive human suffering; from an entity with a 
destructive evil essence, Hamas turned into a relatively unproblematic agent; and from a naturalistic 
cause for war Hamas rockets turned into relatively inconsequential events, we have just witnessed the 
wholesale reorganization of the political-moral field. In line with this, the Guardian presented Israel 
too in a light unrecognizable from the conservative narrative. Extract 3 did not just trivialize Hamas’s 
contribution to the conflict. It did in fact pinpoint the Israeli aim of killing rejectionists as problematic. 
Extract 4 did not just establish the gross disparity between casualty numbers, but pinpointed it as a 
regularity. As these passages did not simply present Hamas as posing no insurmountable problem in 
the way of negotiations but started also to hint at a construction of Israel which does, it comes as no 
surprise that in a later editorial the Guardian explicitly attributes to Israel an ‘intransigent refusal to 
talk to [its] enemies’ (14 January).  
Yet, as replacing the conservative image of Hamas it is Israel that becomes responsible for the war, we 
are once again left with the question of an account. If it is Israel that is ultimately accountable for the 
bloodshed, what is it that causes Israeli intransigence in going against peaceful solutions? Why are the 
vastly disproportionate casualty figures parts of a pattern? Why do Israelis ‘deny the entire course of 
the history of the Middle East’ in persisting to kill rejectionists on the other side? 
Extract 5. 
A hammer blow is intended to terrorise and that is exactly what Israel did yesterday. Dr 
Haidar Eid, a Gazan academic who saw the bodies and children with amputated limbs, 
told Haaretz journalist Amira Hass: ‘To pick a time like this, 11:30 (AM), to bomb in the 
hearts of cities, this is terrible. This choice was intended to cause as large a massacre as 
possible.’ The targets were not the training camps of Hamas's military wing, which were 
empty when the jets struck, but rather police stations. The raids were intended to 
destroy the infrastructure on which Hamas builds its administrative as much as its 
military hold over Gaza. But that means killing policemen, not just the militants who 
assemble and fire the rockets. Presumably it also means targeting judges, officials, and 
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doctors too. (Guardian, 29 December) 
 
The Guardian here raises a question that could not be raised in the framework of the Daily Telegraph: 
what is the reason for an 11.30am start of the war? Yet the introduction of Israel’s responsibility is met 
not so much with an attempt at critical deliberation as with immediate and extreme condemnation. 
The State of Israel is judged as ‘intending to terrorize’ and ‘intend[ing] to cause as large a massacre as 
possible’, as well as, later in the same editorial, showing ‘the same indifference to human life as [it] 
charges its enemies with’. And as the image of Israel in this construction starts to resemble that of 
Hamas in that of the Telegraph, the ultimate account of the Guardian for Israeli action may not come 
as a surprise: 
Extract 6. 
’We are very violent,’ Lieutenant Colonel Amir, commander of an Israeli combat 
engineers unit, admitted as he explained that he will use any method to prevent 
casualties among his troops. Meysa a-Samuni would not disagree. She is the 19-year-old 
survivor of the shelling of a house in the Zeitoun district of Gaza in which 30 people died, 
six of them members of her family. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs would not disagree either. […] 
None of this is new. Those who remember the details of past military campaigns waged 
by Israel, a country which claims higher moral standards than its neighbours, will 
experience an overpowering sense of deja vu. (Guardian, 10 January) 
 
The passage conveys a series of assertions metonymically standing for all parties concerned: Israel, 
Palestinians, the international community. They represent a unanimous verdict with which the 
Guardian may be taken to fully (if implicitly) concur. Thus, similar to the Telegraph’s account of Hamas, 
what the Guardian’s ultimate account intimates is that not only is Israel violent in deeds and violent in 
intention; it appears violently destructive in being. And as regards the other agent of the equation, just 
as for the Telegraph Israeli agency was not so much good as virtually non-existent, so does Palestinian 
or Hamas agency not even enter the equation for the Guardian. 
Thus, what on the surface appeared as two very different accounts of the war may have proved to be 
rather similar. Both newspapers offered a decontextualized understanding of agency, where neither 
historical nor present relations played any role in understanding moral responsibility. Instead, the 
agents constituted polar opposite essences where what varied was solely who played the role of ‘Bad’, 
and who played virtually no role whatsoever; who is to be blamed and who, by and large, is innocent. 
The (Israeli) Jew and the (Palestinian) Arab were therefore imagined of different substances, and with 
any relation between them being not just practically non-existing but an outright theoretical 
impossibility (Benjamin, 2004; Said, 2004). 
 
4. A discourse of relations: The Times and the Financial Times 
The examples examined above are representative of the newspapers’ general perspective on the 
events: it was with recourse to a decontextualized discourse of isolated essences that the British 
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broadsheets most of the time approached the conflict (Kaposi, 2014).2 But not all of the time. In what 
follows, two instances will be analyzed where an alternative discourse is present: the binary of pure 
and impure, blameworthy and innocent become entangled, and the possibility of past and present 
relations becomes a tangible prospect.  
In contrast to the Daily Telegraph, pondering the dilemma of ‘law to war’ the conservative The Times 
held a position open to a critical perspective vis-a-vis Israel’s conduct. Maintaining though Israel’s right 
to launch the war, the newspaper asked the question whether launching the war was in fact the right 
thing to do. Accordingly, the newspaper’s perspective allowed for the existence of a Hamas that is not 
the paragon of nihilistic destruction and an Israel that does not just automatically respond but makes 
choices (Kaposi, 2016). 
Given its non-dichotomous critical perspective on ius ad bellum, it will be interesting to see how this 
perspective developed as the newspaper came to discuss ius in bello.  
Extract 7. 
Eleven days ago The Times reported that Israel appeared to be using white phosphorus 
shells over built-up areas of Gaza. Since then, Israeli spokesmen and women have issued 
a series of increasingly forlorn denials as the number of Palestinian deaths in Gaza has 
passed 1,000 and many of the injured have been treated for burns caused, apparently, 
by white phosphorus. 
It is time to clear the air. [...] (The Times, 16 January) 
The newspaper, being the first in the world to report of Israel’s questionable use of white 
phosphorous and the only one amongst the British broadsheets that discussed it in its editorials, 
does not mince its words (Kaposi, 2016).  First, it does not just lament the number of Palestinian 
deaths or the general conditions in which the people of Gaza are. Material, tagible Israeli 
weapons containing the chemical substance of white phosphorous are mentioned, making 
hence the Israeli army explicitly accountable. Second, it concludes its description with an explicit 
call for explanation. As it unequivocally asserts that ‘[i]t is time to clear the air’, Israel’s role 
becomes an object of moral scrutiny. Thus, a thoroughgoing critical perspective is opened up on 
the agent the newspaper otherwise is mostly in sympathy with. In the place of purity and 
innocence, we have moral responsibility; in the place of the discourse of essences, the discourse 
of relations. 
Where does The Times take the emerging discourse of Israeli responsibility? A doubly intriguing 
argument unfolds.  
Extract 8. 
It is time to clear the air. Israel has a right to defend itself, and the nature of its enemy 
makes that task extraordinarily hard. Hamas, like Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, 
regards the use of civilians as human shields as a central plank of its strategy for 
tormenting Israel. [Its] rallying cry is not the creation of a Palestinian state but the 
destruction of the Jewish one. This is why, when a ceasefire ended last month with an 
                                                            
2 Despite its absence from the present analysis, this statement encompasses the Independent too. For the 
analysis of the Independent, see Kaposi, 2014: 61-66, 74-79, 142-147. 
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onslaught of Hamas rockets aimed at civilian Israeli targets, Israel had no choice but to 
prosecute this war. (The Times, 16 January) 
First, the moral scrutiny of Israel regarding ius in bello commences by invoking ius ad bellum. 
Second, as Hamas is depicted ‘using [Palestinian] civilians as human shields’ and aiming not for 
‘the creation of a Palestinian state but the destruction of the Jewish one’; and as Israel is 
consequently depicted having had ‘no choice but to prosecute this war’, we are presented with 
an argument concerning ius ad bellum which is certainly familiar from the Telegraph – but which 
never previously featured in The Times (Kaposi, 2016). 
Yet, even if Hamas has retroactively become the agent of total destruction and Israel the agent 
of moral purity they never hitherto were, there is of course more to be discussed on the matter. 
As The Times itself reported white phosphorous shells found on the ground, the role of the Israeli 
Defense Forces cannot be overlooked. 
Extract 9. 
White phosphorus is illegal under international law when used in built-up areas, but a 
legitimate weapon of war when used to provide cover for troops in open country. There 
is scant evidence of the IDF using it deliberately against civilians, but northern Gaza, 
where the fighting is concentrated, is one of the most densely populated places in the 
world. Civilian casualties were inevitable, and the deep burns that white phosphorus can 
cause are virtually untreatable. The longer that the IDF equivocate about its use, the 
more ammunition they hand to those who would accuse them of war crimes. (The Times, 
16 January) 
The passage with which The Times closes its discussion of white phosphorous and Israeli 
responsibility is rather striking. It is asserted that white phosphorous is illegal ‘when used in 
built-up areas’, and that the IDF appears to have used it in ‘northern Gaza [...] one of the most 
densely populated places in the world’. When concluding, however, this critical perspective is 
not followed (by, say, calling for an independent inquiry into Israel’s use of white phosphorous 
or even by calling on the IDF to stop using the substance). Instead, by calling merely an end to 
official ‘equivocation’ on the matter, the editorial delegates critical judgement entirely to the 
authority of Israel. Curiously, the critical perspective on Israel is ultimately redirected to 
shadowy characters for whom claims about Israeli use of white phosphorous are mere 
‘ammunition’ to ‘accuse Israel of war crimes’. 
Thus, whilst The Times’ coverage presented a perspective of critical judgment different from 
decontextualized essences, this critical perspective was never quite taken to what may appear 
its logical conclusion. The more it seemed a practical possibility supported by facts, legal 
conventions and moral arguments (all of which dutifully taken up by The Times), the less the 
newspaper was able to follow it up. The more the actual responsibility of Israel became 
interrogated, the more Hamas became demonized. Providing a clear alternative though to the 
essentializing discourse showcased in the Telegraph and the Guardian, The Times’ alternative 
discourse eventually de-composed itself just as it became more convincingly put together.  
In fact, of the broadsheets’ editorials covering the war, there is one single line of argumentation 
where a perspective of relations and the constitutive importance of past and present context 
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could systematically be present. To examine its vicissitudes, we will now turn to the Financial 
Times’ construction of Hamas. 
Extract 10. 
Yet Israel, backed by the US and the mute assent of Europe, has sought to isolate Hamas. 
After Hamas fought it out with Fatah and ejected it from Gaza 18 months ago, the 1.5m 
Gazans have suffered a blockade rationing food, fuel and medicine entering the enclave. 
This policy makes Palestinians dependent on Hamas for basic needs. It makes violence 
an attractive alternative both when (Hamas) truces fail to lift the blockade and (Fatah) 
peace talks fail to deliver peace. It is in any case delusional for Israel to imagine it can 
make peace with half the Palestinians while waging war on the other half. (Financial 
Times, 29 December) 
 
In contrast to its presentation in the Guardian, Hamas in the Financial Times did not become 
trivialized as a relatively innocent entity. It is described as ‘violent’ and living a ‘vainglorious 
delusion’. However (and, incidentally, once again in contrast to the Guardian), it does become 
in the passage above situated in a dynamics of human relations. It becomes an agent which is 
responsive to and partly constituted by, first, the population of Gaza; second, the truce between 
Israel and Hamas; and third, the Israeli blockade of Gaza. Hamas therefore becomes an agent 
which is neither trivial (Guardian) nor something evil-like (Telegraph, The Times), but one that 
is, simply, human. And as such, it also becomes an agent which lives amidst other human agents 
and emerges with respect to these human relations.  
Extract 11. 
Israel’s refusal to treat (sic!) with Hamas is understandable, if futile. The destructive fury 
of its assault on Gaza was not only intended to get over the relative failure of its 2006 
war on Hizbollah in Lebanon. Israel was also determined not to repeat the outcome to 
its 1996 Lebanon war, which ended with codified and internationally underwritten rules 
of engagement with Hizbollah. 
But Israeli unilateralism is a blind alley. Its unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 has 
resolved nothing. The existence of organisations such as Hamas and Hizbollah – which 
both arose as responses to Israeli occupation – cannot simply be wished away. (Financial 
Times, 22 January) 
In this extract, human relations acquire an historical dimension. The origins of Hamas are 
explained as a response to particular Israeli policies. And as we see how Israeli actions have been 
contributing to what Hamas would become, the passage implies an historical account of Israeli 
agency too. Israel becomes not just an agent that responds to Hamas, but one that has been, 
willy-nilly, contributing to the conduct of Hamas. 
Indeed, it is from such a perspective that Israeli action in general and the role of the Israeli 
occupation in particular is presented: not simply something bad, or some crime, or some simple 
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act of oppression – but a mode of relating to other agents and a way of contributing to other 
identities. 
 Extract 12. 
It must be remembered that the root cause of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the Israeli 
occupation – which Israel's 2005 withdrawal from Gaza was meant to consolidate, 
through its subsequent expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Arab east 
Jerusalem. (Financial Times, 29 December) 
Of course, there were newspapers during the war which condemned Israel with more rhetorical 
flourish. But just as no other newspaper came anywhere near the frequency the Financial Times 
occasioned the Israeli occupation in its editorial arguments3, no other newspaper came 
anywhere near to position it as centrally in their arguments as the Financial Times did: ‘the root 
cause of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’. This might be because no other newspaper entertained 
more systematically the discourse of human relations as opposed to human essences, and, 
therefore, no other newspaper sought to account for the war in terms of past and present 
relations instead of decontextualized individual substances. In accounting for Hamas, the 
Financial Times implied not the question whether it was them or Israel to be blamed for the war, 
but what problematic and hurtful political-moral relations have led to the emergence of Hamas 
as it is. 
At the same time, as the newspaper reaches ‘the root cause’ of the conflict, the question arises 
as to how it then accounts for Israel’s conduct. What is it that may explain Israel’s occupation; 
what is the human reality that contribute to this political-moral reality? 
Extract 13. 
The disproportionate scale of Israeli air strikes, in response to the pinprick provocations 
of the home-made rockets fired from Gaza at southern Israeli towns, is less surprising. 
It fits the Israeli doctrine of overwhelming force, which on Saturday claimed the highest 
number of Palestinian lives in a single day since Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza 
in the 1967 Six Day War. (Financial Times, 29 December) 
 
Disproportionate conduct is explained here with recourse to a ‘doctrine of overwhelming force’, with 
the ‘doctrine’ invoked here possibly going back to the early right-wing Zionist Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s 
concept of the ‘iron wall’ (Shlaim, 2004). Clearly, by referring to the somewhat pejorative term of a 
‘doctrine’, the Financial Times indicates its disapproval. But what it invokes implies neither the 
manifestation of a violent essence nor madness: a ‘doctrine’ may be rooted in some real experiences 
and it may stand some chance of being changed through persuasion. 
At the same time, it is instructive that the experience to which ‘overwhelming force’ was a response is 
categorized as ‘pinprick provocations of the home-made rockets’. A non-event, that is. And if the 
experience that was interpreted and subsequently acted upon by the ‘doctrine’ was a non-event, then, 
                                                            
3 30 percent of the Financial Times’ editorial paragraphs featured the phrase ‘occupation’ as opposed to, for 
instance, 4.3 percent in the Guardian or 0 percent in the Daily Telegraph (Kaposi, 2014: 69).  
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in fact, even the Financial Times’s description of Israel starts to imply that state of lunacy. 
Extract 14. 
But if Israel needs to reflect on how its militarist tactics and continuing occupation 
strengthen its most militant enemies, Hamas should recognise how its attacks on Israeli 
civilians have enabled Israel to change the subject: from the occupation to threats to its 
existence. (Financial Times, 22 January) 
The passage displays two crucial features. Its depiction of Hamas is in line with the newspaper’s overall 
coverage: Israeli actions are depicted as contributing to Hamas’s conduct. At the same time, whilst 
rhetorically juxtaposing what Israel needs to do and what Hamas needs to do (i.e. ‘Israel needs to 
reflect on how… Hamas should recognize how…’), this juxtaposition is clearly asymmetrical. The effects 
of Hamas action on Israel merely influence (and are used as ammunition by) Israeli rhetoric. Hamas’s 
‘attacks on Israeli civilians’ are depicted not as contributing to Israeli determination to fight and utilize 
the doctrine of ‘overwhelming force’ but as helping Israelis to ‘change the subject’ from embarrassing 
facts. It is almost as if rockets fired indiscriminately on Israeli civilians are, somehow, welcome in Israel. 
In Extract 13, the Financial Times’ perspective on Israeli conduct could to some extent be taken to 
mirror the newspaper’s perspective on Hamas. In line with the newspaper’s take on Hamas, the idea 
of the ‘doctrine of overwhelming force’ suggested an account given in terms of some genuine (if 
flawed) intellectual content arising out of real world experiences, and not in those of essential violence 
or evil or lunacy. It therefore promised the continuation of a radical alternative to the discourse of 
non-relations as previously witnessed in the Daily Telegraph and the Guardian; and the realization of 
the discourse of relations initially represented by The Times’ treatise of white phosphorous.  
However, the promise of this perspective may subsequently have been lost. Extract 14 displayed a flat 
mitigation of Hamas’s actions, and, correspondingly, implicit denial of any genuine origin of Israel’s 
‘doctrine of overwhelming force’. Thus, it displayed the newspaper’s inability to offer the same kind of 
relational perspective of understanding Israel as it did, consistently and coherently, hitherto with 
Hamas; and, hence, it also made that perspective of understanding Hamas start to sound little more 
than mere whitewashing. Just as in the case of The Times, in the Financial Times too the promise of a 
relational account and the possibility of a critical yet empathic stance towards both agents of the war 
ended very close to the habitual allocation of straight blame and innocence. 
 
5. Discussion 
Reading about the discourse on the conflict in historic Palestine can make us feel doomed. There 
are those arguing that dialogue is impossible because one side of the debate is biased, even 
antisemitic or abusing the term antisemitism to advance its suspicious agendas (cf., Harrison, 
2006; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008; Philo and Berry, 2004, 2011; Wistrich, 2011). And there are 
those arguing that dialogue is impossible because both sides occupy polar (and 
incommensurable) opposites (Bunzl, 2007; Fine, 2009; Klug, 2009). Either way, to establish the 
‘give and take of arguments’ (Klug, 2008: 287) or non-violent forms of solidarity (Sheldon, 2016, 
2017) appears virtually impossible: political-moral hope of human relationships are dominated 
by existential fear. 
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This paper started by asking what relationships between the main agents of the conflict were 
allowed in the political-moral imagination represented by the British broadsheets. And, indeed, 
one of its main conclusion must be that the arguments of the editorials scarcely left us with 
space for any relationship other than violently destructive ones. To be sure, on the surface 
conservative newspapers ultimately accepted Israel’s argument for launching the war whilst 
(left-)liberal ones argued for negotiations. Yet when considering the structure of respective 
arguments, the permanent question irrespective of political orientation was: who is to blame 
and who (by and large) is innocent? Total Israeli innocence in the conservative press was 
matched by absolute condemnation in that of the progressives; whilst demonization of Hamas 
met with Hamas’s role being trivialized to the point of virtual innocence.4 Underlying the 
apparent discussion of political and moral merits, therefore, a quasi-mythological discourse 
transpired (Lynch, 2012). Of real significance was not different degrees of responsibility, but the 
urge to keep the black-and-white essences of purity and impurity apart from each other (Kaposi, 
2014). 
This, then, was an important story to emerge from the analysis of the editorials. In fact, it was 
the overwhelmingly dominant empirical story. But it was not the only story. 
For, in common with what might be considered an emerging line of research in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the present paper also identified a discourse of relations in addition to that 
of incomparable essences (cf., Sheldon, 2016). It found the conservative The Times to advance 
a very strong critical line concerning the responsibility of the Israel Defense Forces; and the 
liberal Financial Times to construct an argument where Hamas (and at points arguably Israel too) 
was not conceived of emerging from and acting out some isolated essence of innocence or 
violence, but was accounted for with regard to past and present relations. Thus, in the place of 
a discourse where the ‘other’ is a radically inalterable, inescapably incommensurable (and often 
essentially violent) ‘Other’, we have found a discourse where that ‘other’ (and, hence, this ‘us’) 
can be engaged with (Benjamin, 2016). In short, the discourse of existential fear was replaced 
by that of political-moral hope. 
This, then, was yet another important story to emerge from the analysis of the editorials. In fact, 
it was perhaps the most important theoretical story. But it too did not amount to the full story. 
The emerging perspective adopted by the present paper is certainly not that of 
optimism/idealism – to be then opposed to pessimism or crushed by realism so called. The 
discourse of relations that was detected in The Times and the Financial Times eventually 
appeared to have (or, at any rate, came very close to have) broken down. If anything, this state 
of affairs might have demonstrated precisely how difficult it is to actualize political-moral 
imaginaries different from the established essentializing ones, and how hope might actually 
become more rather than less difficult to actualize as it is becoming more possible (Mitchell, 
1993). 
Nonetheless, what the paper did also demonstrate empirically was that even where the 
discourse of incompatible essences and inevitable violence dominates and ultimately prevails, 
the prospect of relations is still there. As such, we can look at the (however minuscule) instances 
                                                            
4 See fn 3. 
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where it appears; analyse the conditions from which it emerges; and understand the dynamics 
of its possibly being taken over by the fearful discourse of isolated and violent essences. We can, 
that is, adopt a theoretical perspective which is capable of preserving and thereby extending 
those relations. In the place of who is a Jew and who is an Arab; who is right or wrong; what is 
true and what is false; who is innocent and who should be blamed, we can ask how these 
questions and concepts emerged out of various forms of human relations. That is to say, how to 
bridge the very gaps these questions open up, how to repair the relationships they ripped apart, 
and how to heal those wounds they might have caused.  
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